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A LAWYER'S VIEW OF LABOR ARBITRATION
GEORGE E. STRONG*

The future of labor arbitration and the viewpoint of the lawyer
with reference thereto depend very largely upon the arbitrators and
their procedures, conduct and decisions. Of course, the parties and
their counsel are under a duty, in the words of the Code of Ethics
and Procedural Standards for Labor-Management Arbitration prepared by the American Arbitration Association and the National
Academy of Arbitrators and approved by the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service, "to approach arbitration in a spirit of cooperation with the arbitrator and should seek to aid him in the performance of his duties." Nevertheless, the arbitrator, like the judge, must
have the strength and independence and courage to decide justly,
and so function as to gain and retain the respect and confidence of
all concerned with arbitration, including the public, which has
rights and interests which should be recognized.
Lawyers are accustomed to the greater predictability and certainty
of judicial decisions, and to the right of appeal from the decisions of
trial courts. They wish to be able to advise their clients whether the
position of a company or union will be sustained on an appeal to
an outsider, whether he be a judge or an arbitrator. This may,
in part, explain the widespread use and popularity of industrial courts in Central and South America. The advocate who
is accustomed to fixed rules and procedures in the somewhat technical
and formal atmosphere of the court room finds it difficult to adjust
to a proceeding conducted by an arbitrator who does not follow court
procedure. Nevertheless, lawyers know that there is need for a flexible, informal and friendly private juridical system which can render
a final decision. It is generally known that courts are not always the
best forum in which to settle industrial controversies which often present issues requiring expert knowledge. Besides, time usually is of
the essence if industrial unrest and uncertainty are not to affect the
productivity and well being of the industrial family which inhabits
each plant or establishment. The existing congestion of court calendars
prevents early consideration of labor-management issues. The Supreme Court of the United States in Burchell v. Marsh' expressed its
approval of arbitration at a time when there was little labor arbitration as follows: "Arbitrators are judges chosen by the parties to
decide the matters submitted to them, finally and without appeal.
As a mode of settling disputes, it should receive every encouragement
from courts of equity."
*General Counsel, Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service.
1. 58 U.S. (17 How.) 344, 349 (1854).
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This concept is again expressed in a later decision by the then
existing Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia (now U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit) which states:
"It is the policy of the law, as expressed by both English and American
courts, to uphold the peaceful, swift, and inexpensive method of
terminating litigation by arbitration. 'And such amicable actions,
so far from being objects of censure, are always approved and encouraged, because they facilitate greatly the administration of justice
between the parties.'"2 In Mercury Oil Refining Co. v. Oil Workers
Int'l Union, C10 3 the following appears: "Arbitration is designed to settle controversies and disputes between parties by a method other than
through the regularly established tribunals of justice. Its purpose is
to eliminate future disputes and litigation." To the same effect is the
opinion by Judge Kenyon which reads: "Arbitration is favored by the
Courts. It is a mode of settling disputes less expensive and more expeditious than court procedure. In these days of long drawn out litigation and ever-increasing expense of trial, it may well become a special
4
favorite of the law."
The task of adjusting human relations, economic needs and requirements and social controls in this industrial age so as to give
effect to the expectations and needs of civilized man with a minimum
of friction, lost motion, and waste should be handled by specialists.
The trained and experienced lawyer who represents labor and management in the settlement of their differences is such a specialist, who
can and will do much to shape the future of arbitration and industrial
dispute settlement.
The latter may be accomplished without arbitration. The LaborManagement Relations Act5 recognizes the desirability of settlement
by the parties at the bargaining table. It is obvious that both parties
need the guidance of a lawyer because bargaining must be conducted
within the framework of the law. As stated in section 1 of the Act,
industrial strife may be substantially minimized by recognition under
the law of legitimate rights and that neither employer, employees nor
labor organizations have any right to engage in acts or practices which
jeopardize public health, safety or interest. Consequently, the first
step should be to consult an experienced lawyer in labor problems
and in labor law in time to prepare for negotiation, mediation, factfinding or arbitration as thorough preparation is essential to success.
The next step is to bargain in good faith and attempt to settle any
2. Campbell v. Campbell, 44 App. D.C. 142, 153 (1915), cert. denied, 242
U.S. 642 (1916).
3. 87 F.2d 980, 982 (1951).

4. Wabash Ry. v. American Refrigerator Transit Co., 7 F.2d 335, 351 (8th
Cir. 1925).

5. 61

LMRA).

STAT.

136 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 141-97 (1956) (hereinafter cited as
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and all disputes which may arise upon a mutually satisfactory basis.
Facts and persuasion should replace table pounding, intemperate outbursts, and personalities. The parties usually are educated to the
point where they will settle issues upon their merits if settlement
is desired. At least some reliance should be placed upon the intelligence and judgment of the employee as well as of the union and
the employer.
Only after it becomes apparent that an agreement is unlikely, should
notification be made to the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service within thirty days after a written notice to the other party of
6
a desire to modify or terminate a labor agreement. Thereafter the
lawyer should cooperate with the mediator assigned to the dispute
and see that his client knows that there exists a duty to participate
ful ly and promptly in such meetings as may be undertaken by the
mediator.7 Furthermore, all concerned should know that the mediator
is the friendly advisor of both parties, that he cannot and does not
decide issues or be partial to either side, and that his usefulness depends upon the degree to which both parties trust and confide in
him. Ideas can be tried out with him without being exposed to hasty
or ill-conceived reactions from the other party. Because the mediator
possesses information not known to both parties he can be very helpful in such matters as the timing of proposals, awareness of the
limitations on and needs of both parties and reduction of personality
and status conflicts and reactions. Unlike arbitration there is no risk
of an unworkable or unacceptable decision for a "refusal of either
party to agree to any procedure suggested" by the mediator "shall not
be deemed a violation of any duty or obligation imposed by this
Chapter."' Also, the Federal mediator is prohibited by a specific regulation from disclosing confidential matters or information received in
joint or separate mediation meetings.9
During the course of collective bargaining with or without mediation, arbitration or fact-finding may or may not be deemed appropriate, depending upon the circumstances including the public interest, the cost of coercive tactics and the kind of issues which exist.
Arbitrators, like mediators, are useful to the extent that both parties
trust their discretion, impartiality and judgment.
It has been said that lawyers may hesitate to utilize arbitration because the fees of litigation may be larger than in arbitration, but
the customary guides to the amount of the fee apply to arbitration as
much as to counselling or litigation. Few companies and unions would
6.See § 8(d) (3)LMRA,61

STAT. 140

(1947), 29 U.S.C.A. 158(d) (3) (1956).

7. § 204(a) (3) LMRA,61 STAT. 154 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. 174(a) (3) (1956).
8. § 203(c) LMRA,61 STAT. 153 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. 173(c) (1956).

9.22 FED.REG.162 (1957), amending 29 C.F.R. § 1401.2 (1949).
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assert that the issues to be arbitrated are unimportant, or that in.
sufficient preparation is wise, or that saving money is their major
interest.
Lawyers are fully aware that they are engaged in a learned profession for which they have been long and carefully educated and
trained. They know that they have a duty to do everything within
their power to keep their clients out of controversies, whether they
be grievances, arbitrations or litigation in the courts.
Besides, lawyers and their clients in labor and management are
fully aware of the cost of industrial warfare not only to the participants
but to the general public whose interests deserve more consideration.
They are seeking workable and acceptable alternatives. Therefore,
lawyer's fees in arbitration are a minor consideration when compared with the costs of strikes and industrial unrest or litigation.
Consequently, it is not because of personal reasons that lawyers
may be reluctant to advise their clients to arbitrate interests or even
rights. No one believes that arbitration is a catholicon for the solution of industrial problems as there is always the human equation.
Parties and their lawyers can seek to limit the scope of arbitration,
but if the arbitrator exceeds his authority an expensive and delaying
appeal to the courts may be unavoidable. And if he indulges in unsolicited but well meant advice he may harm the relationship between the parties. Arbitrators are not hired as consultants and few
of them possess the background knowledge and the experience needed
for wise counselling. There are arbitrators who are strict constructionists, others who are liberal in their views. Some seem to be able to
read implications into an agreement which enlarge or restrict the rights
of the parties. Other arbitrators fail to write short, clear, concise,
easily understood opinions. One arbitrator will modify a discharge
which another will sustain because of differing views concerning industrial discipline. A few arbitrators prefer to mediate rather than
arbitrate and many apologize to or express sympathy with the loser,
thereby implying that the winner is somehow at fault.
Therefore, lawyers and their clients are very cautious about selecting
an arbitrator. It is difficult to know in advance that he will be wise,
judicious and impartial. Unless they have known and had experience
with a particular arbitrator they must rely on hearsay or the reading
of his relatively few published opinions. The losing party is often
unwilling to have an arbitration decision published and as a result
many of the most illuminating as well as controversial decisions are
not published. Less than one-half of the decisions filed with the
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service are published. Also,
hearsay concerning an arbitrator's competence and impartiality is
frequently as unreliable as is other hearsay, because unions, employers
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and employees are inclined to react to an arbitrator on the basis of
whether they won or lost a decision.
For these and other reasons there is much misinformation in circulation concerning arbitrators and their decisions. It is not unusual for
the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service to be told that Arbitrator "A" is pro-union and also pro-management, that professors
from particular institutions or members of certain professions should
be excluded and that acceptable arbitrators are not acceptable because of one or two adverse decisions. Of course, there are arbitrators
who make mistakes even as there are judges and lawyers and management and union leaders and other people who are not infallible. A 1947 mistake should not influence the choice of an arbitrator
in 1957. All of us profit from our mistakes. The number of experienced, independent, impartial and acceptable arbitrators is not
so large as to permit of arbitrary rejection. Furthermore, arbitrators
on the federal roster must be and are qualified as well as generally
acceptable to those who utilize its arbitration facilities.
Labor arbitrators are as much aware of their position of trust and
responsibility and are as concerned with the soundness of their
decisions as are judges, referees, examiners, members of boards and
commissions, and other public officials in judicial or quasi-judicial
positions. Many serve as a contribution toward peaceful industrial
relations and at a sacrifice of time, convenience, and their customary
standards of compensation. Half of the arbitrators on the active roster
of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service are lawyers. Unlike public officials, a private arbitrator is employed and paid by the
parties who utilize him to decide a dispute. There are no appellate
arbitration tribunals and stare decisis does not and should not apply
to arbitration. Unless and until rights, duties and principles of industrial relations are established and verified by long experience,
arbitrators should not adhere to the decisions of even the most experienced arbitrators.
It is, therefore, obvious that the lawyer will continue to look with
favor upon the arbitration of labor controversies only so long as the
arbitrator and the arbitration process meet the needs of our industrial
civilization.
To the lawyer, arbitration is a means to an end. If the end is beneficial, the legal profession will continue to assist in perfecting and improving arbitration and will encourage even greater utilization of arbitration as a method of deciding rights under existing contracts.
The arbitration of interests, however, is so contrary to the experience of the lawyer, so fraught with unpredictable consequences,
so wide open and lacking in standards and safeguards at the present
time that it will be utilized by lawyers with great reluctance as a
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last resort and in exceptional circumstances. If an outsider is under
consideration as an aid to settlement of a dispute involving a change
in a labor contract the mediator and the mediation process at the
present time have more appeal to the careful lawyer than have the
arbitrator and the arbitration procedure because the mediator has no
power to decide an issue. His function is purely advisory whereas
the arbitrator makes an award which is usually conclusive of all
questions of fact and law.
The future of labor arbitration depends upon all who participate
therein, including the arbitrator, the parties and their counsel; and
upon how effective arbitration is in settling disputes acceptably without resort to strikes, lockouts, and other coercive activities. In the
final analysis, neither the arbitrators, the lawyers nor their clients
will decide the future of labor arbitration. Public opinion will be
the final arbiter because unnecessary work stoppages and needless
losses and irresponsible denial of needed or desired services, commodities or utilities will not and should not be tolerated by the
American people.

